It’s hard to imagine what could be worse than the barrages that are raining down on Ukrainian cities right now, but the rocket and artillery fire will eventually stop. A more long term risk for Ukraine, one that will permanently hobble its chances of recovery, is a bad peace treaty.
A good peace treaty would recognise Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty and the independence of its government, thus enabling it to rebuild. International aid would pour in and the country could quickly recover. A bad treaty, on the other hand, would disable Ukraine’s government, enshrine outside power brokers, and ensure that the country was so dysfunctional that it could never prosper or defend itself with a powerful army.
But surely a peace treaty is just what’s needed for Ukraine? Surely, anything that ends the war is good? That was the thinking in November 1995 when the leadership of Bosnia Herzegovina was bullied into signing the Dayton Agreement, a deal that is nicely summed up by Wikipedia: “The agreement has been criticized for creating ineffective and unwieldy political structures and entrenching the ethnic cleansing of the previous war.”
One of the problems with the Dayton Agreement was that it created a state within a state – the Serb controlled Republika Srpska – which includes the territory on which (according to international courts and tribunals) Bosnian Serbs committed genocide over the mostly Muslim population. The Serb-controlled entity has been blocking Bosnia’s progress ever since the deal and is now demanding independence. After a decade-long slumber, the Western powers are finally waking up to the risk of Russian/Serb mischief in Bosnia and are reinforcing the EUFOR armed force based here.
The peace treaty itself is “discriminatory” according to Almira Delibegović -Broome QC, a Bosnian/British lawyer based in Edinburgh. Bosnia’s constitution was drafted as part of the Dayton Agreement and the problem is that it assigns “privileged status” to three main ethnicities – Croat, Serb and Bosniak/Muslim. This means that if you are from a minority, Roma or Jewish for example, or even just want to call yourself a ‘Bosnian citizen’ “you cannot stand for the highest political office in the country, be a member of the presidency or the upper house of parliament”. It also ensures that Bosnia’s neighbours, Croatia and Serbia, have powerful levers of control over Bosnia’s triple-headed presidency. The most recent example of this is Republika Srpska vetoed Bosnia’s attempts to sanction Russia after they invaded Ukraine.
According to Vehid Šehić, founder of the Tuzla Citizens’ Forum in northeast Bosnia, another problem with the Dayton Agreement was that it made all three warring parties – the Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs – responsible for ongoing peace and development: “It’s not natural that the nationalist political parties that were active during the war were then made responsible for implementing the peace. It’s completely irrational. This is why we are still living in the wartime period of 1992 to 1995.”
This map shows the extent of Serb-controlled territory within Bosnia Herzegovina. The Serb area is marked in red
Russia learned some valuable lessons at Dayton
Russia was going through one of its rare moments of liberalism at the time of the Dayton Agreement in 1995. Boris Yeltsin was in power and Russia’s Prime Minister, Victor Chernomyrdin (later to be ambassador to Ukraine) witnessed the treaty’s signature alongside the leaders of France, Germany, Spain, the UK and of course the USA. This so-called “Contact Group” of nations followed the USA, which was driving the whole process forward.
In 1995 Russia and the USA were closer than they had been in a century and when the massive NATO “Implementation Force” (IFOR) was imposed on Bosnia Herzegovina the Russians participated with a paratroop brigade, were given an Area of Responsibility in Northeast Bosnia and, extraordinarily, were under the military command of the overall NATO commander, US General Nash. This proves that Russia and NATO forces can work together perfectly well if there is a sensible leader in the Kremlin.
Things seemed to go well in Bosnia Herzegovina for the following years. All sides were glad the fighting was over and, initially, the Bosnian Serb leader (Milorad Dodik) was a gushing advocate of peace and reconciliation with the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. But when he realised that the West was losing interest, and he was losing popularity, he played the nationalist card and started portraying the Croats, Muslims and Western powers as the enemy. Needless to say, he’s very close to the Russians and who knows what advice they give him – for more details on Republika Srpska’s disturbing relations with Russia click here.
The irony is that a liberal (Yeltsin) handed over the keys of the Kremlin to a man who believes in a governing style that has more in common with Ivan the Terrible. But it has to be said that Putin flirted with liberalism in his early years and had no objection to NATO expansion.
I imagine that Russia’s former KGB operatives observed the Dayton Agreement with fascination; they would have seen how the West, with the best of intentions, enforced a treaty on a nation that has resulted in a totally dysfunctional state. The Russians can’t be blamed for the Dayton shambles, but they almost certainly learned from it and may see it as a useful model for stirring up trouble elsewhere. Maybe their plan in Ukraine is to rain down death and destruction, exhaust all parties, and then present a peace treaty that is based on “special rights” for the Russian minority as well as a large chunk of “autonomous” Kremlin-controlled territory. It would be a cheap way of controlling a large country: no need for an occupying army when you can veto anything you don’t like.
It would compound the tragedy of Ukraine if the Western powers were to bully Ukraine into signing a treaty with the aggressor that would debilitate them for generations to come. There is a tendency to assume that all parties come to peace treaties with good intentions. Such a mistake could be fatal for Ukraine.
The image associated with this article was designed by the esteemed Bosnian/American graphic designer Čedomir Kostović. This poster will appear in the forthcoming graphic history book Bosnian War Posters, by Daoud Sarhandi, to be published by Interlink on May 3rd 2022. For more details see our new Instagram page here @BosnianWarPosters
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Yes, the Ukrainians must take note of what happened at the end of the Bosnia war in 1995!
Looking at the two situations, there’s much in common and some critical things that are different.
What’s similar is the brutality visited upon the target nation by a nearby power that can responsibly be called “fascist” — same with Serbia, and the same, clearly, with Russia.
What’s different is that Ukraine already had an army, whereas Bosnia had to cobble one together quickly. Furthermore, Bosnia was placed under an arms embargo as the war was starting while Ukraine is receiving a lot of what it needs to defend itself.
Given this handicap, it’s really remarkable that forces loyal to Bosnia managed to save even a portion of the country from partition and annexation.
Western intervention, at a very late stage, helped — but also hindered Bosnia. There was a point at which the Bosnian government forces probably could have forged ahead and taken more of their country back out of the hands of the separatists, but they were prevented from doing so by Holbrooke–managing things for his US masters.
This is what I fear regarding the outcome of the Ukraine war; so much depends on Western assistance, even though the Ukrainians themselves are taking the brunt of the assault.
What if the West, under the leadership of Biden et al, gets tired of the whole thing, gets distracted by some other conflict, or, perish the thought, a proto-fascist regains the presidency in the US in 2024 (sure, the Ukraine war could still be running then)? In that case, it could engineer another “Dayton.”
You are right Rupert, the Ukrainians need to watch out for this.
Peter Lippman, author, Surviving the Peace; The Struggle for Postwar Recovery in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Interesting, Rupert, thank you. Putin has foreign currency reserves and (for now) hefty petroleum income. His ‘thin ice’ may well be drying up of that income. After all, his personal wealth and that of his oligarchs, isn’t greatly impacted by sanctions. (Or at least they have plenty left to enjoy.) And his citizens (or subjects … ) are kept compliant and generally deceived into a situation between acquiescence and support. But selling less oil and gas, or selling at lower prices, might be the end of his reign.
The Ukraine war can rumble on for all Putin cares. Probably it will. He doesn’t need to take all of Ukraine and, based upon past form, is comfortable with frozen conflicts. And he cannot force NATO back from Poland, Romania, and so on. He’d lose a conventional war that widespread, and we’d all die in a nuclear war!
So the Russian focus will be on disinformation and division. It’s not so hard when 42% of France votes for a Putin-aligned fascist. Where Hungary elects one (again). Where Italy could slip into supporting Russia. And when Trump is moderately likely to return to pal up with his benefactor Vladimir Vladimirovich. When his useful idiot Farage is campaigning against net zero. And so on … the West could fail yet through its ignorance and the venality of its ruling class.
You’re right about Putin’s imperialism. He’s the Czar of some of Russia and wants to be Czar of all Russia. I can understand the paranoia. Distance from enemies didn’t keep Napoleon or Hitler out. And the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact didn’t help in the latter situation! Was Putin’s early 2000s friendliness with the West a modern equivalent that he now sees as a mistake. (One wonders what Stalin made of that pact in Autumn 1941!) So a physical buffer zone isn’t enough. In good Russian tradition there is a need for defence in depth: distance, fear, a fifth column, disorganisation, ignorance … all of which to some degree exist. Perhaps Putin could have had all except distance (which alone doesn’t work) had he withheld his army? With Trump, Le Pen, Orban, pre-war Johnson, and a few others in power, Germany bought with cheap gas, and so on probably Putin could have subverted Ukraine from within.
How? Aggravate the non-Russian minorities that Ukraine disrespected. Provoke the Azov units into repressing ethnic Russians. Fund opposition to Zelensky’s not great peacetime performance. A few assassinations. But those opportunities dried up in 2014, and when has Russia been subtle anyway?
One hopes for a better Russia but I struggle to envision it. I’d start with a renewed Russian Orthodox Church, one that isn’t the evolution of the political beast Stalin created using religious politicians during WW2. And a Russia with a free press. When regular people see light and truth they will ask more of their leaders.
At that point (and indeed some point) the West will need to give Russia an economic point which provides sufficient income. Lots of solar panels and wind turbines to export electricity when Europe is dark or becalmed? That might take Russia beyond a point (and this is important) where Putin sees global warming as a good thing to be encouraged.
A pity you aren’t close enough to meet in a convenient pub …
What an interesting comment Julian. From your list of Putin’s pre-invasion requirements the only one he managed to get right was the foreign currency reserves. Although half of his stash has been frozen abroad, he’s still got a few hundred billion to prop up the currency, smuggle in spares for his ailing arms industry and pay his security forces to intimidate the home population and lie to the world.
Putin’s on thin ice and one never knows when it’s going to crack. But when it does his demise will be instant, shocking, surprising.
Regarding your conclusion — Putin will “ramp up efforts to weaken the west…” — I’m sure he will try to. But the west has finally woken up to Putin’s tactics and it’s going to be a lot more difficult. Until now he had a lot of support in the west and undermining us was easy as we weren’t aware of the risks and would ignore the warnings. And all this is costing money, but his stash will soon run out.
One issue we haven’t touched upon is the very imperialistic approach of Putin’s government. His aim is clearly the restoration of the Soviet Bloc, including the central European nations they used to control, and such an idea isn’t possible in the 21st century. The whole motive behind this is security: Putin doesn’t feel safe in Russia unless he controls all the surrounding nations, as buffer zones. It’s pure paranoia and terrible policy: if the NATO countries actually wanted to invade Russia, a buffer zone wouldn’t stop them. Long range missiles would do the trick. But nobody wants a broken Russia.
I’m glad that we Brits have moved on from colonialism, when we used to take over free people with gay abandon, and sad that Russia and China haven’t.
I hope for a free and democratic Russia that is open to cooperation with the rest of the world. Imagine how much better the world would be if Russia didn’t worry about us planning to invade it; a Russia that wasn’t constantly trying to undermine and divide us; a Russian government that didn’t take lying to a whole new level.
Rupert, another issue that nobody seems to see is the Russian people. Russia was an autocracy and a dictatorship since the beginning. There are very few people, easy to be silenced, that really understand and are prepared to live in a democracy…Russians are simply not prepared: mentally and culturally for democracy and freedom, like many other people from the former communist countries.
Sooner or later they will elect freely a dictator and will support him, e.g. Hungary. It’s all about dictatorship vs democracy and the preparedness of some nations to embrace democracy. We clearly witnessed the dictators’ brotherhood against the free world and sadly some of them are fully supported by their nations. In this fight, dictatorships have some advantages: the decision and resources are in the hands of one person, so it’s easy to make a decision – good or bad – and to use all the necessary resources to fulfill it. The major disadvantage is that a bad decision can destroy so many people lives and countries and nobody can stop it.
So the enemies in this battle are the dictatorship regimes and their nations’ mentalities. Educating people for democracy and how to live and comply with democratic rules, including ethnic minorities rights, is essential and probably more difficult than winning a war.
Thanks for this comment Mariana. I can’t speak for anyone else but I think about the Russian people a lot, and I see the media mention them quite frequently too, usually about how many of them support Putin. I accept your points but don’t think the big issue is about democracy vs. totalitarianism any more — that ship has sailed. I think the current conflict is containing countries like Russia and China which pose a threat to other sovereign nations.
As for the Russian people and what they think, I agree that most may want a tyrant, but I also know that most people in tyrannies have a healthy scepticism when it comes to official news. I’m sure most Russians don’t believe in the Ukrainian invasion but are afraid to speak out publically.
Finally, why is Hungary becoming a tyranny and Romania not?
A very good question Rupert, I asked myself several times the same question …maybe because Romania had a ferocious dictator before and Romanians are more cautious and afraid not to repeat the same mistakes …there were some attempts but unsuccessfully so far. Who knows, usually “the sleep of reason produces monsters” as in Hungary… populism and extreme nationalism are the major danger for our societies and a perpetual temptation both for the leaders and for people as well. I guess we’ve just been lucky that’s all.
Quite some time seems to have passed since you posted this interesting article. I cannot help thinking that Russia has learned some lessons and forgotten others. For example, Russia knows that the West can be ineffective, and that it can (negatively) influence the West’s institutions. And Russia has forgotten the value of military disinformation and surprise, and indeed the lesson that Finland taught the USSR.
I have a theory that Russia needed several preconditions for success in Ukraine:
– Sufficient foreign currency reserves to withstand sanctions
– The EU unable to organise a practical response
– The US unwilling to get involved
– Ukraine too weak to defend itself.
That would point towards an invasion towards the end of Trump’s presidency. But Covid hit Russia hard and perhaps left its army incapacitated. Whilst that was happening the US failed to elect Putin’s candidate. The EU coalesced after Putin’s choice of Brexit. Ukraine had been gaining military capability and resolve since 2014. Russia invaded too late, and then only after making it blatantly obvious what it was about to do. And Putin overestimated the capability of a badly-led army that had been camping out in the cold for weeks. In waiting too long – or being forced to do so – Putin has limited his likely gains and prolonged the cost of what might become another frozen conflict.
As for the final cost: what will Putin do when the West really weans itself off Russian gas? With his back against the wall through the bottom falling out of the Kremlin’s income? With the West using steadily more green energy the price of which OPEC cannot fix? That feels like a dangerous place: and not just for Ukraine.
My guess is that Putin will ramp up efforts to weaken the West so that, relatively, a weak Russia is stronger. Expect considerable interference in the next US election. Greater support for European far right that envies Putin’s fascism. Disruption from Hungary and Serbia. Putin’s stooges in the UK (Farage et al) campaigning against net zero. After all, we are at war with Russia: a deep war on a broad front including a fifth column which is, after all, a Russian speciality.
I’m less concerned about the eventual Ukraine peace deal than by what Putin will try to do to our democracy. If the latter can be saved, there will be hope for the former.
Thought provoking piece.